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FORCED DEDICATIONS AS A CONDITION TO SUBDIVISION
APPROVAL--Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut
Creek (Cal. 1971).
In California, the Subdivision Map Act is the enabling statute
for local supervision of subdivision development.' Under the stat-
ute, the control of design and improvement of subdivisions is vested
in the city or county with a limited right of judicial review to ex-
amine the reasonableness of the enacted ordinances.2 The act re-
quires a subdivider to file a tentative map showing the design of
the proposed subdivision for approval before the land can be legally
sold.3
Through the exercise of its police power, the governing body can
impose any reasonable condition which is designed to conform
the subdivision to the safety and general welfare of the public.
4
These conditions often take the form of uncompensated forced dedi-
cations of land.
The California legislature's recent enactment of Business and Pro-
fessions Code section 11546 illustrates the express authority granted
to municipalities to demand exactions.5 Section 11546 authorizes
the governing body to require that a subdivider dedicate land or
pay fees in lieu thereof for park or recreational purposes as a con-
dition precedent to the approval of his subdivision map.6 By enact-
ing section 11546, the legislature removed any implication arising
from the case law that a city was not privileged to request park
dedication in proper instances.7 Such legislation is the direct result
1. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11500-641 (West 1964).
2. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11525 Supp. I, 1965), amending CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 11525 (West 1964).
3. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11538 (West 1964).
4. The Subdivision Map Act permits the adoption of local ordinances
as defined in the act and it has accordingly been held that such
local ordinances may be adopted when they are supplemental to
the act and are not in conflict therewith, and provided that they
bear a reasonable relation to the purpose and requirements of the
act. Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 636, 318 P.2d
561, 564 (1957).
5. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11546 (West 1965).
6. Id.
7. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 11 Cal. App.
3d 1129, 90 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1970).
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of current municipal financial problems which make the provision
of necessary services impossible.
Most cities have suffered a common experience when dealing
with mass subdivisions.8 Plats are approved, homes are sold, and
new residents move into the community only to find that neces-
sary public services have neither been installed nor are they
forthcoming. A situation follows in which either the new resi-
dents are faced with inadequate services or the entire community is
forced to bear higher taxes. Such taxes are in fact attributable
to the new subdivisions. Most municipalities in the United States
are presently experiencing a financial crisis due to inadequate
economic resources to meet increasing demands for all types of mu-
nicipal services.9
Some of this burden has already been alleviated by legal decisions.
Courts have found no serious constitutional obstacles to sub-
division ordinances requiring the installation of streets,10 sidewalk
sewers,12 and drainage facilities.13
Unfortunately, the California decisions have neither been uni-
form in result nor in rationale. Much of this confusion was di-
rectly attributable to the supreme court's last major statement on
the area in Ayers v. City Council of Los Angeles.14 This case
upheld the validity of forced dedication for streets, but the language
of the opinion left a legacy of confusion in the lower courts. 15
Recently, the supreme court again faced the problem of forced
8. For an example of city planning preparation, see City of San Diego
Council Policy, 600-10 (1971). For an excellent discussion of many of the
problems associated with the Subdivision Map Act in California, see Tay-
lor, Current Problems in California Subdivision Control, 13 HASTINGS L.J.
344 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Taylor].
9. For another excellent general discussion and an illustration of the
tremendous growth pressuring municipalities, see Heyman & Gilhool, The
Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Subur-
ban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Heyman].
10. Ayers v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
11. Evola v. Wendt Constr. Co., 170 Cal. App. 2d 21, 338 P.2d 498 (1959).
12. Longridge Estates v. City of Los Angeles, 183 Cal. App. 2d 533, 6
Cal. Rptr. 900 (1960).
13. City of Buena Park v. Boyer, 186 Cal. App. 2d 61, 8 Cal. Rptr. 674
(1960).
14. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
15. Taylor, supra note 8 at 352.
dedications. The interpretation of the language of the decision up-
holding the constitutionality of section 11546 promises to be of great
importance in establishing the permissible limits of subdivision ex-
actions.
The facts of the case itself are very brief. The City of Walnut
Creek enacted ordinances pursuant to the authority granted by
section 11546 implementing a general park and recreation plan.
An association of home builders brought an action for declaratory
and injunctive relief seeking a determination of the constitutionality
of section 11546, and the city's ordinance and supplementing resolu-
tions.
The trial court sustained the constitutionality of both the statute
and the implementing ordinances. On appeal, the judgment was
reversed in part.'6 Those portions of the city's ordinance and
resolutions which provided for payment of an in lieu fee for other
than land acquisition purposes were held invalid.
17
Justice Mosk, expressing the unanimous view of the court, re-
jected most of the court of appeals' arguments and held that fees
could be used for other than land acquisition purposes. However,
the decision is most important in that the language of the court pro-
vides new guidelines for the permissible use of forced dedications.
Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d
633, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606 (1971).
Before the supreme court, Associated contended that to avoid
problems concerning equal protection and due process the dedica-
tion requirement must be justified by establishing a strict nexus.
That is, the subdivision alone must be responsible for the increase
in population which necessitates new park and recreational facilities.
The court strongly rejected Associated's argument. In consider-
ing Associated's contention the court re-examined the Ayers deci-
sion. Prior to Associated, the courts had uniformly interpreted
Ayers as requiring that the necessity for the dedication be inherent
in physical conditions created by the development itself.'8 The
court held that such a view was incorrect.' 9 It held that Ayers did
16. 11 Cal. App. 3d 1129, 90 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1970).
17. Fifty-three cities and counties submitted briefs amicus curiae in sup-
port of the city's contention that the language of the opinion invited litiga-
tion and that fees could be used for other than land acquisition purposes.
18. Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 872 (1969); Mid-Way Cabinet, etc. Mfg. v. County of San Joaquin, 257
Cal. App. 2d 181, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1967).
19. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633,
638, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634, 484 P.2d 606, 610 (1971), appeal dismissed, 40
U.S.L. W. 3175 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1971) (No. 71-86). [hereinafter cited as As-
sociated].
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not require that the subdivision be individually responsible for the
increased need.
However, it is suggested that the actual basis for the holding can
be found in the great need for recreational facilities.20 The court
recognized the urgency of the problem and the need for immediate
positive action. It reasoned that present and future demands for
recreational facilities necessitate affirmative action on the part of
government and that the increase in population has warranted
such methods for protecting the general welfare of the public. In-
deed, the court was emphatic in stating:
We see no persuasive reason in the face of these urgent needs caused
by present and anticipated future population growth on the one
hand and the disappearance of open land on the other to hold that
a statute requiring the dedication of land by a subdivider may be
justified only upon the ground that the particular subdivider upon
whom an exaction has been imposed will, solely by the develop-
ment of his subdivision, increase the need for recreational facilities
to such an extent that additional land for such facilities will be
required.21
Associated's second major contention related to the imposition of
fees. They argued that fees in lieu of dedication constituted a gen-
eral revenue device since the benefit could not be directly related
to the subdivision. The court, by upholding the language of 11546
and eliminating a strict nexus requirement, removed most of the
grounds for Associated's argument.
Because of the uniform acceptance of the nexus requirement,
courts had been unwilling to allow fees in lieu of dedication. This
was sometimes the result of an inability to point to the specific
benefit. Provisions of this nature have also failed since the courts
viewed such requirements as exceeding the scope of the police
powers.
22
Before Associated, the leading California case concerning fees
was Kelber v. The City of Upland.23 This decision invalidated a
local ordinance requiring the subdivider, as a condition of approval,
20. This is apparent from the court's own admission that the decision
could be justified without the support of Ayers. Associated, 4 Cal. 3d at
638, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634, 484 P.2d at 610.
21. Associated, 4 Cal. 3d at 639, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634, 484 P.2d at 610.
22. See, e.g., Santa Clara County Contractors Assoc. v. City of Santa
Clara, 232 Cal. App. 2d 564, 43 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1965).
23. 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957).
to pay a fee into a general park and school fund. The fees were
to be used collectively for the benefit of the entire city. The city
contended that the requirement was compatible with the tendency
to extend the police power to include greater areas of public wel-
fare.
The case was decided on grounds of lack of authority in the Sub-
division Map Act. Language in the opinion suggested that, even
with express legislative authorization, such an expansion of the
police powers would be invalid.
The Kelber rationale had generally been upheld in decisions prior
to Associated. Whenever general funds were used, the courts were
quick to hold that such a procedure exceeds the scope of the act.
24
The view had been that such procedures were actually revenue
measures made under the guise of the police power.
Section 11546 provides that fees may be charged in lieu of dedica-
tion and that only the payment of fees may be required in sub-
divisions containing fifty parcels or less.25 This section clearly con-
tains the express authorization that was absent in the ordinances
involved in the Kelber decision.
In Associated, the court of appeals defined the term "recreational
facilities" so as to limit the manner in which fees could be collected
and used. It held that fees could be used to purchase land for rec-
reational facilities when suitable land was not found within the
subdivision. Fees could only be used to purchase other land and
could not be used to purchase improvements such as bleachers, bats,
balls, slides, swings, or other forms of capital improvements.
Here, however, the supreme court did not accept this position
and held that the intent of the legislature26 was to allow fees to be
collected for the purchase and improvement of park and open space
facilities and that these improvements were to include necessary
equipment and development costs. Fees can now be required in
lieu of dedication for purchase of land outside the subdivision.
Fees may also be used to improve land already owned by the city
which serves the needs of the subdivision.2 7
24. See, e.g., Santa Clara County Contractors Assoc. v. City of Santa
Clara, 232 Cal. App. 2d 564, 43 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1965), and Wine v. Council of
City of Los Angeles, 177 Cal. App. 2d 157, 2 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1960). However,
Longridge Estates v. City of Los Angeles, 183 Cal. App. 2d 533, 6 Cal. Rptr.
900 (1960), held such an arrangement valid even though the benefit to the
subdivider could not be specifically pointed out.
25. CAT. Bus. & PROF. CoD- § 11546 (g) (West 1965).
26. Cal. Report of the Assembly Interum Comm. on Municipal and
County Gov't, v.6, no. 21, at 43 (1963-1965).
27. Associated, 4 Cal. 3d at 647, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 641, 484 P.2d at 617.
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The use of fees in lieu of dedication should promote effective plan-
ning. Costs of development can be apportioned among many sub-
divisions, each of which has contributed to the total need.
As far as the court was concerned neither the requirement of
fees nor the elimination of a strict nexus requirement presented a
constitutional problem. The court felt that constitutional chal-
lenges to section 11546 were unfounded for two distinct reasons:
First, section 11546 provides its own standards which eliminate
any need for a direct connection requirement.28 The act requires
that the dedication shall be used only for the purpose of providing
park or recreational facilities to serve the subdivision.29 The act
does not require that the facilities be located on the land of the sub-
divider, but they must bear a reasonable relationship to the future
inhabitants of the subdivision.30
The second basis for holding that section 11546 was within the
proper exercise of the police power comes from the court's view that
subdividing is not a right but a privilege.31 Since the subdivider is
seeking to acquire the advantages of subdivision, he has a duty to
comply with reasonable conditions for dedication. The court held,
based on authority found in Ayers, that eminent domain was not in
issue since it is not unreasonable to force a subdivider to conform to
municipal requirements.32
In light of section 11546's own limiting requirements, it appears
that a discussion of the privilege argument was unnecessary. How-
ever, the topic is noteworthy in that it demonstrates a difficulty
in explaining subdivision exactions.
None of the California cases to date have squarely faced the
question of why an uncompensated taking for public use is unconsti-
28. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11546 (c) (West 1965).
29. Id.
30. In that this was a declaratory action, specific facts were not pre-
sented which would provide a meaningful example of when the court would
find a reasonable relationship. However, the court did decline to rule on
the validity of forced dedications for facilities like regional parks which are
not conveniently located near the subdivision. The court stated that in
view of § 11546, this was not in issue. This in itself provides some insight
into the scope of the application of the statute.
31. Associated, 4 Cal. 2d at 638, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634, 484 P.2d at 610.
32. Id.
tutional in all areas but that of subdivision controls.38 The cases,
from other jurisdictions, that do discuss the limits of the police
power are not very precise in identifying the principles which un-
derlie their judgments.3
4
In determining the validity of uncompensated dedications, the
courts have alluded to several tests to define the constitutional lim-
its of the government's- power to regulate the use of land. The
courts must first decide whether the purpose of regulation comes
within the constitutionally acceptable objectives of the police power.
In other words, does the purpose of the regulatory action properly
involve the protection of health, safety, morals, or the general wel-
fare?
35
If the exaction is related to the public welfare, as it appears to be
in Associated,3 6 the courts must then decide if the exercise of the
regulatory power is reasonable. In any determination of whether
an exaction is reasonable the court must consider various factors.
For example, in order to be valid, the court must decide that the
regulation is not arbitrary or discriminatory and does not involve
a taking.
Arbitrariness generally relates to a determination of whether
there is any logical relationship between the regulation as applied
and the posted objective. 1 The discrimination test is, at its core,
the requirement of equal protection of the law. In respect to land
use regulation, equal protection requires that similarly situated
landowners must be treated in the same manner.38
33. The two California Supreme Court cases specifically dealing with
forced dedications fail to establish standards which would indicate the con-
stitutional basis for their decisions. Associated, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 94 Cal. Rptr.
630, 484 P.2d 606 (1971); Ayers v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d
31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
34. The courts have been unable or unwilling to establish the definite
limits of the police power. People v. Brazee, 183 Mich. 259, 149 N.W. 1053
(1914), affd 241 U.S. 340 (1916).
35. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Miller v.
Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925), appeal dismissed,
273 U.S. 781 (1927).
36. The protection and conservation of the natural resources of the state
is in the general welfare and serves a public purpose, and so constitutes
a reasonable exercise of the police power. Peabody v. County of Vallejo, 2
Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935); Tulare Irrigation District v. Lindsay-Strath-
more Irrigation District, 3 Cal. 2d 489, 45 P.2d 972 (1935).
37. Kelber v. The City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561
(1957).
38. Any attempted exercise of the police power which results in a denial
of the equal protection of the laws is invalid. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S.
553 (1931).
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The taking test seeks to distinguish between situations in which
regulation is proper and those in which eminent domain must
be used to accomplish the public objective. 9 The general rule is
that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regula-
tion goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.40 If there is a
taking, the power of eminent domain is involved and compensa-
tion is mandatory.4 ' If, on the other hand, there is only regulation,
it is the police power which is being used and no compensation
is required.
4 2
No one test has been developed which can clearly separate permis-
sible regulation from prohibited taking.43 However, two different
rationales tend to be of some importance in determining the reason-
ableness of a forced dedication.
The first approach seeks to weigh the disadvantages imposed upon
the owners of the regulated land against the advantages flowing to
the community from the regulation.44 A second view, which is of
particular importance in Associated, seeks to determine whether
the regulation confers on the land owner a correlative benefit.45
That is, does the land owner receive a benefit that sufficiently
compensates for the enforcement of the regulation? If, after com-
paring any advantage to the burden, no correlative benefit can be
established, the regulation constitutes a taking.
Subdivision exactions have been treated as a sub-species of land
regulation but have been subject to the same constitutional limita-
tions as zoning and other more common forms of land regulation.46
39. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
40. Id.
41. An exception to the constitutional requirement of compensation for
a taking is recognized in emergency situations. In this narrow exception
the government may, by exercising the police power, take private property.
42. See, e.g., 11 E. McQuiLtnn% THE LAW Or Mu iPcAL CoRPORATIoNs,
§ 32.04 (3d ed. 1964).
43. The boundary line of the police power "cannot be determined by any
general formula in advance." Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349,
355 (1908).
44. This approach has been credited to Justice Holmes' opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
45. Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914) (applied the
correlative benefit rationale).
46. See, e.g., Jenad Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d
673 (1966).
Unlike zoning and other forms of land regulation, the permissible
limits of subdivision control have been unclear due to the courts' re-
luctance to squarely face the issues.47 In Associated, as in most
similar cases, the reader is given no indication of what standards
were used to determine the constitutionality of the statute. Justify-
ing subdivision exactions by characterizing subdividing as a privi-
lege provides no understanding whatsoever. 4s
The weakness of the decision, in not providing constitutional jus-
tification, becomes apparent when certain arguments are isolated
for consideration.
The court held, without explaining why, that section 11546 did
not deny equal protection of the law as applied to subdividers,
This would leave one to assume that all developers will be treated
similarly in respect to park dedications. Anyone who greatly in-
creases a city's population density would be forced to contribute.
Such a view would be necessary to support the court's holding that
section 11546 is not discriminatory.49
To the contrary, it could be argued that not all developers are
forced to contribute. Builders of apartment complexes are in no
way required to provide any type of facilities. This is true despite
the fact that apartment builders are responsible for the greatest
population density. Associated contended that both apartment
builders and subdividers were in a similar class and that any dis-
tinction between the two constituted discrimination.
The court did not answer this challenge with an argument that
would settle the constitutional issue. The court tried to establish a
meaningful distinction between the two types of developers by ar-
guing that the apartment builder did not use as much land as the
subdivider and that excessive land use was the basis for section
11546.50
In no way does this satisfy the constitutional test of requiring
reasonableness. Since two landowners might be responsible for the
47. However, Mid-Way Cabinet, etc. Mfg. v. County of San Joaquin, 257
Cal. App. 2d 181, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1967), provides an adequate constitutional
discussion.
48. The court stated that the clear weight of authority upholds the con-
stitutionality of statutes similar to § 11546. The court felt that its support-
ing cases from other jurisdictions were decided on the basis of the privilege
theory. See, e.g., Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont.
25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964); Jordon v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d
608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965); and Jenad Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d
78, 218 N.E.2d 673 (1966).
49. See note 38, supra.
50. Associated, 4 Cal. 3d at 642-3, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 638, 484 P.2d at 614.
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same degree of population growth, it would seem that to force one
and not the other to contribute is clearly discriminatory.
It is true, of course, that apartment builders do not come under
the authority of the Subdivision Map Act since they do not subdi-
vide the land. Nevertheless, if the purpose of the regulation is to
force new residents to pay their fair share of municipal costs,
the court failed to specifically state a constitutional basis for not
including both types of developer in the same class.51
A possible solution to this problem might be the passage of ad-
ditional legislation requiring exactions from large apartment devel-
opers. Such legislation could be patterned after certain portions of
the Map Act. This solution would have the advantage of providing
more needed recreational facilities while meeting a possibly valid
constitutional challenge.
Another constitutional question left unanswered is the result
of forcing the subdivider to pay the entire cost of the new rec-
reational facility. When dealing with improvements like interior
streets it does not seem unreasonable to force the developer to com-
pletely assume the cost. There is little doubt that the primary pur-
pose of the regulation relates to the new residents of the subdivi-
sion. A developer must provide for ingress and egress and it is im-
material that other residents of the community might also be inci-
dentally benefited.5
2
However, when dealing with improvements like parks, the bene-
fits to the entire community cannot be so easily discounted. For
example, since most new subdivisions are basically separate com-
munities, interior streets are primarily used only by the new
residents and their guests. This situation can be contrasted to a
new park that is likely to attract residents from the entire com-
munity simply because it is a new facility.
The court failed to show how the subdivider has been benefited
to such an extent that it is permissible to force him to individually
pay the entire cost of the new facility. 53 The question becomes:
51. Id.
52. The manner in which dedicated streets were to be used is specifically
discussed in Ayers. Ayers v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207
P.2d 1 (1949).
53. See note 24, supra.
is being located near a park such a benefit to the future residents
that they should be forced to pay its entire cost? Granted, other
citizens of the community may use the park less, but any difference
in the amount of use is outweighed by the fact that the other
residents in no way had to share in the park's development cost.
The court, relying on Ayers, again held that it was immaterial
that other citizens would also be benefited by the recreational facil-
ity.54 It appears obvious that this rationalization is nothing but a
restatement of the basic constitutional issue to be decided.
Forcing only one group within the community to establish most
of the new recreational facilities does not appear to be particularly
fair. However, it is felt that the court was unquestionably correct
in recognizing that the urgent need for open space and recreational
facilities justified any inequities that might exist in the application
of section 11546. Other authorities agree with this position.
In an ideal world the problems of municipal finance would be met
more surely and just as fairly by some system more thorough
than subdivision exaction. In the meantime, municipalities must
meet the demands of the day as best they can, finding a few hun-
dred thousand dollars here and there, whenever they can. So long
as our sense of fairness is not seriously affronted--and exactions of
the sort we have discussed here fall well within that limit-mun-
icipalities must be left to find their salvation.55
Section 11546 was favorably received by the court because of the
statute's own clarity. It is clear on its face and does provide its own
limiting provisions. Many forms of dedication are not based on the
same express, clear authority found here. Since it is difficult
enough to establish constitutional justification for clear statutes
demonstrating the express authority of the legislature, the courts
should be relucant to uphold dedications based on strained readings
of the Map Act. The courts should exercise restraint in upholding
municipal ordinances which have not been specifically authorized
by the legislature until they are ready to squarely face constitutional
problems.
The legislature should also demand that municipalities, who use
the Map Act to force dedications, provide sophisticated cost account-
ing techniques as a basis for determining the extent of exactions.
Cost accounting is a method available to relate cost and dedication
to potential users in order to avoid questions of discrimination and
taking. By using cost accounting a city could divide equitably
the cost of new facilities between new residents in different subdi-
54. Associated, 4 Cal. 3d at 638, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634, 484 P.2d at 610.
55. Heyman, supra note 9 at 1157.
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visions, and between new residents in subdivision developments
and all of the community's other residents. Modern cost account-
ing techniques allow accurate calculation of costs for various
facilities allocable to new subdivisions. When applied, to the en-
tire community, figures can be established which guarantee that
new residents pay no more than their fair share of the municipal
cost.
CONCLUSION
The Associated decision will be welcomed by conservationists
and planning commissions who have long insisted that the provision
of recreational areas in subdivisions is a necessity. Section 11546
can now be used to provide facilities that will benefit subdivision
residents and allow implementation of effective city recreational
plans.
In light of precedents allowing other forms of forced dedication,
section 11546 does not appear to be unreasonable. As the court
pointed out, it contains its own limitations which insure that the
exactions will relate to the subdivision. The court did not err in
allowing the section to stand. The real criticism of the court can
only be that it evaded the opportunity to establish firm constitu-
tional grounds for the validity of subdivision exactions in general.
As other forms of forced dedications are challenged, the wel-
fare of the public will be of the utmost importance. Applying the
rationale behind the Associated decision, environmentalists and
city planners should be able to protect our communities and pro-
vide our citizens with the necessary facilities for effective urban
living.
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